4 min read

Why is CL-USDC on incredibly neg funding?

Source: http://x.com/i/article/2041428503015657472

Short answer:

More sellers than buyers Med answer:

Equity perps on trade.xyz use the front month futures as their oracle, so when it rolls, the oracle price must discount by the full spread (which is negative right now due to backwardation) - structurally similar to a dividend drop or the ETH merge Long answer:

WTI's forward curve is in extreme backwardation with front month May contracts trading $113.10, June $98.70 = a calendar spread of $14.40 or about 12.7%

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This will converge towards the end of Apr when the rolls happen, but for the purposes of this article its irrelevant. Trade.xyz 's CL-USC(WTIOIL) rolls from the 8th-14th Apr.

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https://docs.trade.xyz/consolidated-resources/roll-schedules Funding rates on WTI crude and Brent oil trade.xyz perps on Hyperliquid are running at approximately -300% annualised right now because the oracle tracks front month ($113.10), and after the rolls, back month ($98.70). Its like a stock paying out a large dividend, or ETH pre-merge.

The trade has been to short the perp, long CME back month futures, wait for convergence around April 14th. The guaranteed oracle repricing shows up as severely negative funding, shorts pay longs continuously until the roll completes/people cover their shorts.

If all else stays equal, the pnl is:

CME: $0 (no price change)

HL direct pnl: $112.65 (current) - $98.70 (back month) = $13.95

HL funding: -0.0368%*24*7.5*avg(112.65,98.7) = -$7.00

For a PnL of $6.95 with approx 50% eaten up by funding.

The implication is funding is still not negative enough for a no-arbitrage scenario.

In fact the CL-USDC roll in Feb proved extremely lucrative, with positive funding + CME convergence meaning both legs got paid out.

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Prev month's spread yielded handsome profits and now everyone is drawn in.

Longer, more speculative answer:

Enter Abraxas Capital. They are likely looking at the same data and came to conclusion its a good funding arb - Short the HL/trade.xyz perp (receive the oracle roll adjustment, collect carry from positive funding i.e., longs pay you) - Long the CME June future (CLM6) as the hedge

They started putting on the Brent trade on the 27th March, when the calendar spread was around $6~

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https://hyperdash.com/?chart1=xyz:BRENTOIL&snoop=0x5b5d51203a0f9079f8aeb098a6523a13f298c060 The economics at that level were reasonable: $6 of expected roll-adjusted gain, with funding friction that, while negative, was manageable.

However this quickly blew out to $10. Abraxas is now paying funding at a rate calibrated to a much wider spread than the one they traded into, as more traders piled in after them, substantially eroding the expected return.

Having taken 20% of Brent OI they have gotten themselves in quite the mess. While not as punishing as WTI, Brent's realized + expected funding is projected to eat up ~80% of the returns...

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Projected funding (red dotted) is current funding extrapolated. 11th Apr weekend set to 0 as prev weekends have had neutral funding historically

In TradFi, if a calendar spread arb becomes widely known and attractive, more participants pile in. This tends to compress the spread: the act of buying the back month and selling the front month directly affects the prices. Your competitors make your trade better over time, or at least price it more efficiently. On a crypto perpetual DEX, the mechanism is different. Shorts on the perp increase open interest imbalance on the short side, and push mark below oracle even more. More shorts generally don't compress the calendar spread on CME (assuming no mm hedge) as they have no presence there. What they do is push the funding rate more negative, as the imbalance between longs and shorts widens. The new entrants are simply making the existing arb more expensive. Each wave of new short sellers - enticed by the same apparent roll-adjusted return - pushes mark lower vs oracle, increasing the carry cost for everyone who is already short, including those who got in early at tighter spreads.

Final note Protocols like Boros allowed one to hedge their funding exposure. Volume was relatively light, but the initial price was set far too high and it seems a bunch of retail yield chasers got absolutely nvked by sophisticated counterparties trying to lock in anything above the fair val of about -500%