What Ethena is telling us about the crypto market
Source: http://x.com/i/article/2030350966139289600
Crypto markets have been risk-off for several months now and I have been sifting through various forms of market data for signs that things may be turning. In this article I will dive into the market structure of perpetual futures and some insights about risk appetite from data provided by Ethena's transparency dashboard. TLDR: Ethena's deployed capital is at the lowest point in years, at just 71% of the 2025 lows. This is not an indictment of Ethena but rather a reflection on the state of the market. Directional shorts are almost in parity with directional longs, a highly unusual and historically unsustainable balance in crypto.
Cryptocurrency markets have long been characterized by their extremely volatile assets and the copious amounts of leverage that traders embrace. My own work,
Towards Understanding Cryptocurrency Derivatives: A Case Study of BitMEX
looked at the novel 100x perpetual futures being offered on BitMEX.
Since the days of BitMEX, cryptocurrency futures have become the most traded product in crypto with 5x to 20x the volume of spot markets. As the epicenter for retail-facing leverage in the market, it makes sense to look towards perpetual futures to get a sense of what the risk appetite for crypto looks like.
Ethena in particular gives us an extremely unique window into the cryptocurrency derivatives market. Ethena as shown below implements the cryptocurrency carry trade. The strategy is simple, when a crypto trader goes long, Ethena offers to be their counterparty and go short against them. Ethena then makes sure to buy exactly the amount of assets they are short. In a way, Ethena is providing leverage as a service. Traders want exposure to crypto upside but lack capital, and Ethena has capital but little appetite for risk, so traders use perpetual futures as a way of borrowing this capital from Ethena at the cost of the basis + funding on the perp.
Source: docs.ethena.fi / 4pillars
By the construction of perps, every long matches a short, they are 1:1. Each contract of open interest on a perp represents an agreement to a cashflow between two parties. The exchange's role is to facilitate the matching of these contracts, ensuring that each contract always has a well-funded long and short owner. The following matrix shows the four possible outcomes for matches made by the exchange.
Perpetual future contract matrix
Every trade has a buyer and a seller. When the buyer and seller of a contract are both long or both short, the exchange simply transfers ownership of the contract side from one party to the other. This transfer does not create or destroy any contracts. When the buyer is long but the seller is short, a new contract must be created with the buyer taking the long side and the seller taking the short side, growing open interest by 1. On the other hand, if the seller is long and the buyer is short, the exchange can simply unplug the buyer and seller from a contract and delete the newly free'd contract, reducing open interest by 1.
So in a typical market, who actually owns these contracts? I propose that there are essentially 4 kinds of contract owners:
[Long] Directional Longs
[Short] Directional Shorts / Hedges a. Direct asset Shorts / Hedges b. Structured product Hedges
[Short] Basis Traders (Ethena & Others)
[Mixed] Perp-Perp arbitragers
Directional longs want exposure. They are risk-seeking and their demand for risk is a function of their risk-appetite.
Directional shorts are a mix of actors who want downside exposure to an asset as well as those who want to hedge things they own in a tax efficient way. VCs and employees at companies that are compensated in tokens often want to hedge tokens that are vesting at today's prices. In the case of altcoins, many markets are too thin to support meaningful direct hedges or simply do not exist. In this situation, a company such as Cumberland, Wintermute, FalconX, Flowdesk, Amber, etc. can create a dynamically managed synthetic position that utilizes a short on several correlated liquid assets such as Bitcoin and Ethereum to hedge the exposure of a less liquid market such as Monad. This also would include project such as Neutrl @Neutrl which implement these kinds of hedges as a yield strategy.
Basis traders are opportunistic short sellers. They are not interested in directional exposure and volunteer to match excess demand from directional longs when the market is imbalanced. In most market regimes, demand for longs exceeds the demand for shorts and their role is to pick up the difference. Their ability to scale up and down is typically very elastic.
Perp-Perp arbitragers are both long and short perps. Their role is to connect different perpetual futures instruments together and fix any small price discrepancies up to the cost of trading fees. Their longs perfectly match their shorts at any point in time.
By construction, every perpetual futures contract is 1:1 and longs match shorts, so we know that:
DirectionalLong+ArbitrageLong=DirectionalShort+BasisShort+ArbitrageShortDirectional_{Long} + Arbitrage_{Long} = Directional_{Short} + Basis_{Short} + Arbitrage_{Short}
Additionally, the structure of perp-perp arbitrage tells us that:
ArbitrageLong=ArbitrageShortArbitrage_{Long} = Arbitrage_{Short}
Cancelling this from the first equation gives us:
DirectionalLongs=DirectionalShorts+BasisShortsDirectional_{Longs} = Directional_{Shorts} + Basis_{Shorts}
Ethena provides us with a proxy for all basis shorts which provides useful insights into the difference between directional longs and shorts.
The following figure is Ethena's self reported balance sheet broken into cash and deployed capital from December 27th, 2024 to March 7th, 2026:
Data Source: https://app.ethena.fi/api/collateral/historical?startTimestamp=1514782800 In 2025 the market turned sharply risk-off following the
coin launch in January and continued to slide into the initial tariff discussions and finally liberation day in April. During this time, Ethena's deployed capital collapsed from over 5 billion to just $1,108,078,914, a decline of over 75%.
Recall that Ethena's deployed capital is a proxy for the amount of excess long demand in the market. While Ethena is not the only entity performing this trade, they are large (~25% of Binance & Bybit at times) and as long as they have excess cash they should grow their book to fill any unmet long demand. This tells us that while total demand for long exposure likely did not decline by 75% into April 2025, the excess demand unfilled by directional shorts did.
The image below shows the deployment of Ethena's balance sheet relative to its total size, the 2025 min and the 2025 high.
Data Source: https://app.ethena.fi/api/collateral/historical?startTimestamp=1514782800 Looking at today's market, the amount of capital deployed by Ethena across all markets (BTC, ETH, SOL, BNB, XRP, HYPE) is just $791,241,545.6. This is 71% of the lowest print in 2025 and just 12.9% of the highest print before 10/10. This number is not an indictment of Ethena but rather a reflection of the state of the market; the net demand for longs is historically small.
In particular, Ethena had over 2 billion dollars deployed during the market crash that took Bitcoin to $60,000. Since that day just a month ago on February 8th 2026, the deployed capital has fallen a staggering 60%!
The following image zoom's in on Ethena's deployed capital as well as the price of Bitcoin since January of this year.
Since the move down to $60,000 on BTC, Ethena's basis position has shrunk by over 60% from north of 2 billion to less than 800 million. This move is curious since the market has been relatively flat during this period. A few explanations for this include: 1. A gradual unwind of profitable but unsustainable basis trades (the basis has moved favorably negative but funding is also negative) that were created from the February crash.
2. Competition from directional shorts and hedging activity from price insensitive actors that is crowding out opportunistic basis traders.
3. Lack of demand from longs seeking leveraged exposure.
Source: Coinglass
In my opinion, the truth is largely a mix of factors 1 and 2, and only slightly attributed to factor 3. As the image above shows, the overall open interest on Bitcoin (and other majors) has been somewhat stable during this period where Ethena has been unwinding. At the same time, funding rates have spent a considerable amount of time negative, and many coins such as SOL have a negative cumulative funding rate on several exchanges. This suggests an increasing demand to be directionally short or hedge some type of exposure.
If I had to guess, I believe that smaller crypto companies and VCs alike are going through a crisis. Think smallcap projects like (Eigen, Grass, Monad, etc.). There are hundreds of these coins and each one represents dozens of VCs, a company with a treasury and employees. The VCs need to cap losses and lock in gains to meet fund mandates, and the companies need to protect their runway and headcount. This creates a scenario where all parties need to draw as much blood from a stone as possible and the answer is a relatively crowded trade in the form of actively managed structured products that short a basket of correlated assets.
We see some evidence of these structured products in explosive up-days on ETH which ignites short covering rallies in a number of mid and small cap crypto names as well. The other evidence would be an aggressive crowding out of opportunistic basis trades such as Ethena. Whatever the reason is, we can be sure that for one of the first times ever, directional longs and directional shorts in crypto are nearly at parity. There is no good reason why this cant be the new normal or why this regime needs to change, but looking across other asset classes and markets it is highly unusual for this trend to sustain.