17 min read

PayPal Has 420M Users. PYUSD Still Can't Touch USDC.Why?

Source: http://x.com/i/article/2043309281618116608

I. A Counterintuitive Fact

PayPal boasts 439 million active accounts, operates in over 200 countries and regions, and processes 1.79 trillion USD in total payment volume (TPV) annually, commanding roughly 45% of the global online payments market.

To put that in perspective: nearly one out of every two online payments worldwide goes through PayPal.

Yet PayPal's stablecoin PYUSD, launched in August 2023, has a market cap of only about 3.9 billion USD as of April 2026.

By contrast, Circle's USDC sits at approximately 78 billion USD in market cap—20 times that of PYUSD.

The more telling comparison lies in on-chain transaction volume: in 2026 year-to-date, USDC's on-chain volume has reached 2.2 trillion USD, surpassing USDT's 1.3 trillion USD and setting a new all-time high. Meanwhile, PYUSD's 24-hour trading volume has consistently hovered between 100 million and 200 million USD—USDC's daily average volume is nearly 100 times greater.

This raises a question worth exploring in depth: Why have the 430 million users of the world's largest payment platform played virtually no role in the stablecoin race?

The answer lies in a concept many people conflate—the fundamental difference between Traffic and Infrastructure.

II. Core Data Comparison: PYUSD vs USDC

Let's start with the hard numbers to build intuition:

Dimension PYUSD USDC Issuer Paxos (commissioned by PayPal) Circle Launch Date August 2023 September 2018 Market Cap / Circulation ~3.9 billion USD ~78 billion USD Supported Chains 9+ (ETH, SOL, Arbitrum, Stellar, etc.) 32 chains with native issuance Cross-Chain Protocol No proprietary protocol CCTP (cumulative volume: 126 billion+ USD) DeFi Integration Depth Limited; mainly on Kamino, Spark, etc. Aave, Compound, Curve, Uniswap, etc.; TVL over 12 billion USD DEX Liquidity Pool Share Marginal 34%+ of DEX liquidity pools contain USDC 24h Trading Volume ~130–170 million USD ~13 billion+ USD On-Chain Holders ~125,500 Millions 2026 YTD Net Supply Growth Positive but limited in scale +4.5 billion USD (highest among all stablecoins) Compliance Audit WithumSmith+Brown monthly attestation Deloitte (Big Four) annual audit Institutional Distribution Network PayPal/Venmo internal ecosystem CPN (global bank/PSP/VASP network) Cross-Border Payment Infrastructure Xoom (PayPal sub-product) CPN + StableFX + CCTP Regulatory Framework NYDFS-regulated (via Paxos) GENIUS Act Day 1 compliant; MiCA compliant

This table reveals a core truth: PYUSD trails USDC by one to two orders of magnitude across nearly every infrastructure dimension.

And PayPal's much-celebrated 430 million users? They don't even appear in this table—because they have no bearing on a stablecoin's infrastructure competitiveness.

III. Traffic ≠ Infrastructure: The First Principle of Stablecoin Competition

3.1 The Nature of Traffic: A Temporary Aggregation of User Attention

What are PayPal's 430 million users, fundamentally? They are consumers who use PayPal for online checkout, P2P transfers, and BNPL installments. They chose PayPal because it's convenient, trustworthy, and widely accepted by merchants.

But this "user relationship" has a fundamental characteristic: It is application-layer, shallow-connection, and substitutable.

When users check out with PayPal, they don't care whether the underlying asset is PYUSD, USDC, or fiat—they care about "did my money arrive?" PayPal can slot in any payment instrument behind the scenes, and users neither know nor care.

This is the essence of "traffic": a temporary aggregation of user attention that can be lost at any time to a better experience, lower fees, or stronger subsidies.

3.2 The Nature of Infrastructure: The Inescapable Underlying Rails

USDC's competitive advantage comes from an entirely different source. It is not a consumer product—it is a financial infrastructure protocol.

Think about it: when a DeFi protocol needs a stable unit of account for lending collateral, it chooses not PayPal's user base, but USDC's on-chain liquidity depth and cross-chain composability.

When a multinational corporation needs instant settlement between Asia and Latin America, what matters isn't how many registered users PayPal has, but whether Circle's CPN network can complete the transaction within a compliance framework.

When an AI Agent needs to autonomously execute a payment on-chain, it simply cannot "log in to a PayPal account"—it needs a programmable, composable, chain-native payment protocol.

The competitive moat of infrastructure lies in this: once you become the standard, everyone builds on top of you, and you become the inescapable underlying rails.

This is why Visa never pays users deposit interest, yet remains one of the most profitable financial companies in the world—because Visa is infrastructure, not an application.

3.3 Two Analogies to Clarify the Point Analogy One: WeChat has 1.3 billion users, but SWIFT still stands.

If you look purely at user count, WeChat Pay dwarfs any payment network. Yet global cross-border trade settlement still runs on SWIFT—not because SWIFT offers a better experience (quite the opposite: it's slow and expensive), but because SWIFT connects over 11,000 financial institutions worldwide, creating network effect lock-in.

The relationship between PayPal and PYUSD is like the relationship between WeChat and "WeChat International Remittance": user base ≠ financial infrastructure status. You can use WeChat to send 100 yuan to a friend, but you can't use WeChat to settle a cross-border commodity trade.

Similarly, you can use PayPal to buy a pair of shoes online, but you can't use PYUSD as the underlying collateral for Aave's 12 billion USD lending pool—because PYUSD's on-chain liquidity depth, cross-chain interoperability, and DeFi protocol integration simply aren't deep enough.

Analogy Two: TCP/IP vs. a Super App's Feature Button.

For a more technical analogy: USDC is like the internet's TCP/IP protocol—invisible, unglamorous, and completely unknown to users, yet all data must pass through it. Every website you open, every email you send, runs on TCP/IP underneath.

PYUSD is more like a feature button inside a super app—visible, easy to find, beautifully designed, but it only works within that one app. Close the app and it ceases to exist.

Protocol layer vs. application layer—this is the foundational logic of stablecoin competition. 3.4 The Fatal Mismatch in User Profiles

There's another layer of difference that often gets overlooked: the mismatch in user quality and behavioral patterns.

Dimension USDC Users PYUSD Users User Type Traders / Institutions / DeFi Protocols / AI Agents General consumers Usage Frequency High-frequency capital flows (daily turnover far exceeds PYUSD) Low-frequency payments (occasional use when shopping) Average Transaction Size Large (institutional settlement, DeFi collateral) Small (everyday spending) Switching Cost Extremely low (on-chain operations, completed in seconds) Relatively high (tied to PayPal account system) Usage Motivation Essential (DeFi on-ramp, hedging, settlement) Optional (fiat balance already works fine)

A stablecoin's value derives from "large capital moving frequently," not "small users transacting occasionally." PayPal's 430 million users average about 60 transactions per year on PayPal, but the vast majority are completed in fiat, entirely unrelated to PYUSD. USDC's on-chain users, while fewer in number, are high-frequency, high-value, and highly sticky—because their use cases are essential, not optional.

This leads to PYUSD's most fundamental problem: It is solving a problem that doesn't hurt.

IV. PYUSD's Six Structural Weaknesses

4.1 The Root Problem: PYUSD Solves a Problem That Doesn't Hurt

This must be stated first, because it is the root cause of everything else.

For PayPal's 430 million users, fiat balances already work perfectly well. They can already complete all daily payments using PayPal balance, bank cards, or BNPL installments. PayPal's checkout conversion rates are already high, Venmo's P2P transfers are already convenient—users have zero incentive to convert fiat into PYUSD.

USDC's success is precisely the opposite: it solves problems that Web3 users actually feel—DeFi on-ramping requires stable assets, on-chain trading requires settlement instruments, cross-chain operations require unified liquidity, and institutions need a compliant digital dollar. In these scenarios, without USDC, users and institutions simply cannot complete their operations.

Put differently: USDC is the "road"—without this road, you can't reach your destination. PYUSD is a "convenience store on the roadside"—nice to have, but not essential.

Unless PayPal forcibly converts all fiat settlement to PYUSD in a way that is completely invisible to users (unrealistic from both regulatory and UX perspectives), the vast majority of those 430 million users will never proactively use PYUSD.

4.2 Insufficient On-Chain Liquidity Depth: Subsidized Liquidity Doesn't Stick

One of a stablecoin's core value propositions is serving as the "universal intermediary" for on-chain liquidity. USDC appears in over 34% of DEX liquidity pools, and the total USDC locked across Aave, Compound, Curve, Uniswap, and other protocols exceeds 12 billion USD. This means a vast share of DeFi's trading, lending, and liquidation activity flows through USDC.

PYUSD's presence in DeFi is extremely limited. It did achieve rapid TVL growth in 2025 through incentive programs on Aave, Kamino, and other protocols—at its peak, PYUSD supply in some protocols surged to hundreds of millions of dollars.

But the moment incentives stopped, liquidity fled.

This is a verified fact: PYUSD's story on Aave is a textbook case of "subsidy-driven growth." High incentives attracted large deposits, but on-chain borrowing demand couldn't keep up with supply—utilization rates remained persistently low, indicating that this liquidity came not "because people needed PYUSD" but "because there was free money to be had." Once the incentive period ended, supply became excess and TVL decayed rapidly.

Contrast this with USDC: its DeFi lockups are organic and demand-driven. People borrow USDC on Aave because they need leverage to go long on ETH. People provide USDC liquidity on Curve because trading fee revenue is sufficient to justify the capital. These are real demands, independent of any subsidies.

This is a classic chicken-and-egg problem: no DeFi integration means no on-chain liquidity; no on-chain liquidity means no DeFi protocol is willing to integrate. USDC spent eight years breaking this cycle, building a self-reinforcing liquidity flywheel. PYUSD tried to jumpstart this flywheel with subsidies, but subsidies create "fake chickens"—cut the feed, and the chickens run away.

4.3 No Proprietary Cross-Chain Infrastructure

Circle owns its proprietary CCTP (Cross-Chain Transfer Protocol), a burn-and-mint native cross-chain protocol that has cumulatively processed over 126 billion USD in cross-chain USDC transfers. In Q3 2025 alone, it processed 31 billion USD—a 740% year-over-year increase. CCTP doesn't rely on third-party bridges, doesn't need liquidity pools, and doesn't produce wrapped tokens—it keeps USDC native, unified, and 1:1 across 32 chains.

What does this mean? It means a developer building an application on Arbitrum can accept payments from users on Ethereum using USDC seamlessly—no bridge needed, no slippage, no extra fees. This atomic-level cross-chain composability is a capability PYUSD entirely lacks.

PYUSD has been deployed on 9+ chains (recently expanded to around 13 via LayerZero), but its cross-chain transfers depend on third-party bridging protocols, and liquidity is fragmented across different chains. It's like opening 9 branch stores nationwide where each store's inventory is completely isolated—it looks like broad coverage on the surface, but in reality it's liquidity fragmentation.

If a market maker needs to move 50 million USD in stablecoins between Solana and Ethereum quickly, CCTP completes the USDC transfer in seconds with zero extra cost and native tokens. With PYUSD, it requires third-party bridging, facing liquidity constraints, potential slippage, and bridge security risks. The choice is obvious.

4.4 A Dimensional Gap in Institutional Distribution Networks

Circle's CPN (Circle Payments Network), launched in 2025, has already reached 3.4 billion USD in annualized transaction volume, connecting global systemically important banks (GSIBs), payment service providers (PSPs), and virtual asset service providers (VASPs), and has opened new corridors in emerging markets like Brazil and Nigeria. Over the full year of 2025, Circle processed 217 billion USD in USDC redemptions—a figure that alone speaks to USDC's depth of integration with the global banking system.

Combined with StableFX (instant stablecoin-to-fiat conversion), Circle Gateway (chain-abstracted unified balances), and Arc (smart contract wallet infrastructure), Circle has built a full-stack financial infrastructure spanning from on-chain to off-chain, from institutions to developers.

PayPal's distribution network, while massive, is a closed ecosystem: PYUSD circulates primarily within PayPal and Venmo. PayPal does handle cross-border remittances via Xoom and partners with MoonPay and M0 through its PYUSDx framework, but these are fundamentally strategies of "stuffing PYUSD into PayPal's existing pipes"—not building new financial infrastructure.

Here's an analogy: Circle is building the highway. PayPal is running a taxi company on the highway. No matter how many customers the taxi company has, the highway will never become yours.

4.5 A Generational Gap in Compliance Credibility

Circle's USDC was designed for compliance from Day 1: Deloitte (Big Four) annual audits have been running for years, reserves consist 100% of cash and short-term Treasury bills, it fully meets GENIUS Act requirements, and it has secured electronic money token issuance qualifications under the MiCA framework—making USDC the first stablecoin in the world to simultaneously satisfy both U.S. and European regulatory frameworks. Additionally, EURC (Circle's euro stablecoin) has become the leading euro stablecoin with over 50% market share.

PYUSD's issuer, Paxos, is also regulated by NYDFS, and its reserve structure is compliant. But there are two key gaps: first, its auditor is WithumSmith+Brown (not a Big Four firm), which carries less credibility in institutional eyes; second, Paxos recently completed its OCC trust charter conversion, and there remains uncertainty about how it will operate under the new regulatory framework.

For an institution managing billions of dollars in assets, the first criteria when choosing a stablecoin isn't the issuer's user count. It's: Are the reserves safe? Is the audit credible? Is the regulation clear?

On all three questions, USDC leads PYUSD.

4.6 A Fatal Flaw in the AI Agent Era

This is the most easily overlooked yet potentially most decisive point.

We are entering an era where AI Agents are driving an increasing share of economic activity. AI Agents need to autonomously execute payments, settlements, and liquidations on-chain—they won't be opening the PayPal app and entering a password. What they need is: programmable, chain-native, composable digital currency.

USDC is naturally designed for this scenario: it is an ERC-20/SPL standard token that can be directly called by any smart contract, can automatically flow between chains via CCTP, and can be embedded in any DeFi protocol's logic.

PYUSD is also an on-chain token, but its ecosystem integration, cross-chain capabilities, and DeFi depth are insufficient to make it the preferred settlement instrument for AI Agents. When your stablecoin can be found in 34% of DEX pools vs. integrated into only a handful of protocols—the AI Agent's choice is obvious.

USDC's on-chain transaction volume in Q1 2026 surpassed USDT for the first time, reaching 2.2 trillion USD. A Standard Chartered report noted that stablecoin on-chain velocity has doubled over two years, reaching 6 times per month. How much of this growth is driven by AI Agent-powered automated trading? We can't yet quantify precisely, but the direction is crystal clear: chain-native infrastructure will capture an ever-larger share of payments, and virtually 100% of that incremental volume will flow to USDC, not PYUSD.

V. PayPal's Real Dilemma: An Application Company Trying to Build Infrastructure

5.1 Genes Determine Destiny

What is PayPal's core competency? Consumer experience, merchant networks, risk management algorithms, checkout conversion rates. These are all application-layer capabilities. PayPal's success over the past 25 years came precisely because it never needed to worry about underlying payment infrastructure—it built on top of the banking system and card network rails, focusing on delivering the best front-end experience.

But stablecoin competition takes place at the infrastructure layer. This requires building not a great app, but a set of underlying rails that global financial institutions are willing to plug into. This demands an entirely different skill set: regulatory compliance, multi-chain infrastructure, developer ecosystem cultivation, and cross-chain protocol design.

The fact that PayPal commissioned Paxos to issue PYUSD tells you everything: it treats stablecoins as a "product," not as "infrastructure." This is a strategic choice—perhaps a sound business decision (PayPal doesn't need to become Circle)—but this choice means PYUSD can never compete with USDC at the infrastructure level.

More critically, there's a difference in strategic priority. Circle's entire mission is "to become the global digital dollar infrastructure," with all resources concentrated on that single objective. PYUSD is merely an enhancement feature for PayPal—its main business remains payments, and PYUSD is a side item. When you're just a "bonus feature" for a company, you can never beat the competitor who treats it as their entire reason for being.

5.2 Closed vs. Open

PayPal's business model is built on a closed ecosystem: you pay, receive, lend, buy crypto, and use BNPL all within PayPal, and all data and transactions stay inside PayPal's system. This is an excellent commercial moat, but it fundamentally contradicts blockchain's open, composable, permissionless nature.

USDC is a "Lego brick"—anyone can use it to assemble new financial products without signing a contract with Circle, without applying for an API key, without waiting for approval. A developer in Africa can build a cross-border remittance application based on USDC today and launch it tomorrow. This permissionless composability is something PYUSD cannot replicate.

When PayPal launched its PYUSDx framework, allowing developers to issue application-specific stablecoins based on PYUSD, it was essentially trying to use "openness" to compensate for infrastructure shortfalls. But the question is: why would a developer choose to build on PYUSD instead of USDC? USDC has deeper liquidity, broader chain support, and stronger cross-chain capabilities—unless PayPal provides additional subsidies or incentives.

And if the Clarity Act ultimately passes with its "ban on stablecoin interest payments" provision, even the subsidy route is cut off. Competition would revert to fundamentals: distribution networks, compliance credibility, and ecosystem integration—precisely the things Circle spent eight years building.

5.3 3.9 Billion vs. 78 Billion: Not a Gap—A Dimensional Difference

PYUSD's 3.9 billion USD market cap is not small by stablecoin standards—it's already the third-largest compliant stablecoin behind USDC and USDT. PayPal's brand, distribution channels, and consumer base did help PYUSD achieve a rapid cold start, with supply growth exceeding 600% in 2025.

But the distance between 3.9 billion and 78 billion is not a linear gap that can be "closed in a few years"—it is a dimensional gap:

  • A large portion of USDC's 78 billion USD is locked in DeFi protocols—this capital won't migrate just because PYUSD offers an 8.87% APY, because it serves systemic functions like lending collateral, liquidity provision, and trade settlement.
  • USDC's 2026 net supply growth reached 4.5 billion USD, the highest of all stablecoins (USDT actually saw a net decrease of about 2 billion USD over the same period). That 4.5 billion represents new on-chain dollar demand choosing USDC as the entry point—not because USDC has a better UX, but because USDC is irreplaceable at the infrastructure level.
  • USDC's native issuance across 30 chains, CCTP's 126 billion USD in cumulative processing, and CPN's global banking network—these are infrastructure assets built through years of time and trust, not something any number of PayPal users can substitute.

VI. Judging Stablecoin Competitiveness: What Metrics Actually Matter?

Many people analyzing stablecoin competition instinctively look at "user count," "app downloads," and "brand awareness"—metrics that were indeed central in the consumer internet era. But in infrastructure-layer competition, these metrics are almost meaningless.

Infrastructure thinking:

  • On-chain settlement volume — USDC 2026 YTD: 2.2 trillion USD
  • DeFi protocol TVL — USDC: 12 billion+ USD
  • Cross-chain processing volume — CCTP: 126 billion+ USD
  • Number of natively supported chains — USDC: 32
  • DEX liquidity pool coverage — USDC: 34%+
  • Institutional connections / global banking network — CPN: GSIBs + emerging market corridors
  • Net supply growth (proxy for new real demand) — USDC 2026 YTD: +4.5 billion USD

If you evaluate using traditional metrics like user count, PayPal crushes Circle. If you evaluate using the metrics above, Circle crushes PayPal.

Which set of metrics you use depends on whether you understand that stablecoins are fundamentally infrastructure, not consumer products.

VII. A Generalizable Framework: Beyond Stablecoins

This "Traffic vs. Infrastructure" analytical framework actually generalizes to many other domains:

Domain "Traffic Player" "Infrastructure Player" Who Won? Search Yahoo (portal traffic) Google (search algorithm + ad infrastructure) Google Social MySpace (first-mover user base) Facebook (social graph + developer platform) Facebook E-Commerce eBay (transaction matching traffic) Amazon (warehousing logistics + cloud infrastructure) Amazon Payments Bank online portals (legacy customers) Visa/Mastercard (global clearing network) Visa Stablecoins

PayPal/PYUSD (consumer traffic) Circle/USDC (financial infrastructure) ?

The pattern is consistent: During technology paradigm shifts, the application-layer player with the most users almost always loses to the player that builds the new paradigm's underlying infrastructure.

Not because users don't matter, but because once infrastructure becomes the standard, the application layer becomes a tenant of the infrastructure—no matter how many users you have, your transactions ultimately run on someone else's rails.

Conversely, once you become the infrastructure standard, traffic gravitates toward you automatically—you don't go find users; all users must pass through you. This is the story of TCP/IP, the story of Visa, and it is becoming the story of USDC.

VIII. What PYUSD Means for CRCL Investors

As a CRCL holder, seeing PYUSD's market cap grow to 3.9 billion USD, its deployment to 70 international markets, and its 680% annual growth rate, one might naturally worry: "Could PayPal ultimately squeeze out USDC with its user base?"

My answer: No—and PYUSD's existence actually validates USDC's infrastructure value.

8.1 PYUSD Validates the "Stablecoins Are a Big Market" Narrative

The better PYUSD does, the more it proves that the stablecoin TAM is real and expanding rapidly. Only a fraction of a user's daily digital dollar needs is met through PYUSD. The vast institutional settlement, DeFi interaction, cross-border payment, and AI Agent payment demands still require an infrastructure-grade product like USDC to handle.

Total stablecoin market cap has surpassed 315 billion USD, with monthly transaction volume approaching 1 trillion USD. At this scale, PYUSD and USDC are not in zero-sum competition—they serve entirely different demand layers: PYUSD serves the consumer retail payment layer; USDC serves the global financial infrastructure layer. The value scales of these two layers are completely different.

8.2 PYUSD's Growth Path Is Precisely the Proof of USDC's Moat

What has PYUSD done to expand its ecosystem? Launched PYUSDx so developers can build on top—effectively conceding that on-chain composability matters. Deployed to multiple chains—effectively conceding that multi-chain coverage matters. Partnered with MoonPay—effectively conceding that it lacks native on-chain distribution capability. Ran incentive programs on Aave—only for TVL to collapse when incentives stopped, proving that organic liquidity is the true moat.

Every step validates that what Circle already possesses (CCTP, CPN, 32-chain native issuance, deep DeFi integration, 12 billion USD in organic lockups) is the real battlefield of stablecoin competition.

8.3 Through the Lens of Peter Thiel's "Seven Questions"

Testing with Thiel's monopoly framework:

Breakthrough technology?

USDC's CCTP + CPN + full-stack infrastructure vs. PYUSD's integration within PayPal—the former is infrastructure innovation; the latter is product extension.

Right timing?

GENIUS Act + MiCA implementation + AI Agent rise—everything validates demand for compliant on-chain infrastructure.

Monopoly on a small market?

Circle has already monopolized the "compliant stablecoin infrastructure" niche. PYUSD has a place in the "consumer stablecoin" niche, but these two niches operate at entirely different value scales.

Right team?

Circle is a company whose mission from Day 1 has been infrastructure; PayPal is a payment application company dabbling in stablecoins as a side business.

Distribution?

USDC's distribution doesn't rely on consumers—it relies on global financial institutions, DeFi protocols, and the developer ecosystem. This B2B + B2D distribution is something PayPal's B2C traffic cannot replicate.

Durability? 126 billion+ USD in CCTP cross-chain transfers, CPN connecting global banks, 217 billion USD in redemptions processed in 2025—these are decade-scale infrastructure lock-ins.

Unique insight?

Circle's belief is that stablecoins are not a payment product but the foundation of the next-generation financial infrastructure—this is the essence of the "Visa of the digital age" thesis.

8.4 The Cross-Impact of the Clarity Act

If the Clarity Act ultimately passes with its ban on stablecoin interest payments, the blow to PYUSD would be far greater than to USDC.

PYUSD currently offers approximately 3.75% annualized rewards within the PayPal app to attract users—this is arguably PYUSD's most critical growth engine. If this path is blocked, what competitive advantage does PYUSD have left? Only the PayPal brand and in-app distribution—but we've already demonstrated that these are "traffic," not "infrastructure."

USDC? The vast majority of its 78 billion USD in circulation isn't there for interest yields. DeFi users hold USDC because they need it for collateral, market-making, and settlement; institutions hold USDC because they need it for cross-border payments on CPN. Whether interest payments are banned or not has zero impact on these core demands.

So if the Clarity Act passes, it would actually be a structural tailwind for USDC: subsidy-based competition is eliminated, competition reverts to fundamentals, and Circle's eight years of infrastructure building become even more valuable.

IX. Conclusion: Don't Be Fooled by User Counts

One of the most dangerous mental models in investing is judging a product's competitiveness by "user count." At the application layer, user count is indeed a core metric. But at the infrastructure layer, the key metrics are entirely different: number of network nodes, protocol integration depth, cross-chain interoperability, institutional connections, and on-chain transaction volume.

PayPal's 430 million users are a remarkable business achievement. But in the stablecoin arena—an infrastructure race—it's like a messaging app with a billion users trying to compete against the global telecom backbone. User count is not the battleground; the protocol layer is.

USDC's 78 billion USD in circulation, 2.2 trillion USD in annualized on-chain volume, native issuance across 32 chains, 126 billion USD in CCTP processing, and the global banking network CPN—none of this can be caught up to by throwing money at subsidies or funneling in users. This is the result of eight years of relentless infrastructure building.

The endgame for stablecoins is not "whose app has more users" but "whose protocol becomes the default rails of global finance."

In the world of finance, the road matters more than the people on it.

PayPal has the people. Circle controls the road.

On this matter, PYUSD and USDC were never on the same track to begin with.

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