8 min read

What Most People Get Wrong About Prediction Markets

Source: http://x.com/i/article/2045946885106741248

Two media outlets,

@axios and

@MorePerfectUS, both came out last week to explain what prediction markets are to the mass public. While Axios’ Dan Primack tried to provide a neutral forum for a robust debate with the Kalshi founders (even if his bias was somewhat readily transparent), MPU’s Trevor Hayes instead took a more direct stake in sensationalizing prediction markets as a social ill.

To be honest, I am partially sympathetic to both of their views. As someone who spent his career on the intersection of Wall Street and crypto, I understand the growing unease towards hyperfinancialization that is contributing to a culture of “gambling public health crisis.” At the same time, what these reporters often get wrong is that they jump from this conclusion to solve backwards who the enablers are, often mischaracterizing and conflating several issues in one overly simple narrative. One second we are talking about “insider trading” and the next second “online casinos” all to end up on “gambling addictions.” But this is what most people get wrong about prediction markets: no matter what you think about the ills of hyperfinancialization (via 0DTE options, swap-based ETFs, meme stocks), the story about prediction markets should instead be lauded as an enabler of high agency, truth discovery, and a moral right for its decentralization.

My essay below is an attempt to deconstruct this more thoughtfully.

The blurry line between “investing” and “gambling” is solely determined by your view of whether one is +EV or not, rather than whether the system itself is deterministic or stochastic. In other words, it’s defined by the player, not the game.

Let's unpack that. The first thing I noticed in the MPU coverage how often Trevor Hayes phrases his questions by starting, “given that it is obvious that prediction markets are gambling...” as if that is a foregone conclusion. That fundamental assumption needs to be examined first.

The greatest trend in finance over the last two decades is that the clear line between “investing” and “gambling” has become thinner and thinner. Consider that 1) 60% of US equities volume is all HFT, and it is monopolized by Jane Street and Citadel in an oligopolistic structure, 2) passive ETFs hold over 90% of ETF AUM (though active strategies are starting to make a long overdue comeback), and 3) the average holding period of US equities has shortened from 9 years in the mid-1970s to just about 6 months in 2025 (!). Meanwhile, daily trading volume has more than TRIPLED over the past decade, again driven by algorithmic trading. Overarching these stats is another indomitable trend: retail investors now account for more than $5Tn in trading activity in 2025, which is up roughly 50% from 2023.

Yet you will not find many pundits calling out that “stock trading” is gambling. Why? Because most people will agree that stock picking is not like gambling, because it (presumably) requires skill. This is a key understanding, for one of the reasons that “gambling” becomes descriptively unfair is that it conflates “games of skill” and “games of chance” under one umbrella. Take for example that slot machines and poker are both called gambling. But many would already intuit that is not totally fair, for slot machines are a -EV strategy that is purely based on chance, whereas poker can be a +EV strategy based on actual skill.

To put it bluntly, the definition of “investing” and “gambling” largely has to do with whether one believes the strategy permits +EV or not. It has nothing to do with the “game” itself, whether it is deterministic (pure RV arbitrage and slot machines both are) or stochastic (stock picking and poker).

Prediction markets, like poker, are a stochastic game with a deterministic component. And whether you think it is “gambling” or “investing” is purely determined by the player, i.e. you, and likely whether you are a high-agency, high-skilled person or a low-agency, low-skilled person (or some cross section of each). This then brings us to the second question: if we are considering gambling to be player-driven “speculation,” how does such a market exactly work, and who seeds the liquidity?

“The flipside of speculation is insurance.”

All financial innovations, at first, look like gambling. This was the case with the original stock market (ripe with fervent insider trading), the futures market (Eurodollars were the first political “insider trading” instrument of government officials), and of course, to modern day, commodities (where there is virtually no way to define insider trading in a classical sense). This is strictly because the flip side of speculation is insurance. It is the same coin, for such is a zero-sum game that is defined by strict synthetic risk transfer. And not all “information” is naturally born of private enterprises.

This brings to the next question that prediction market critics will often raise: “some markets are functionally speculation only, and they should not exist because they don’t create any value to society.” Most often, the primary poster child for this argument is sports betting. Because sports is entertainment, betting on entertainment is assumed to be fundamentally unproductive, as the assumption goes.

Except this is wrong. Entertainment is social consumption. One might even say entertainment is a fundamental reason why humans find life so fulfilling. But more importantly, entertainment itself is economic consumption, which means it has a two-sided market. The sports industry generates $50B+ in revenue. Once you add the surrounding ecosystem (media, equipment, apparel, sports nutrition, etc.) the number is estimated at $1T+. Consider Nike, which pays millions in sponsorships for players and teams. They have real economic interests in how they choose to allocate their capital (and therefore hedge) based on the outcomes of sporting events and their players. The fact that society today has broadly conditioned itself to think of sports betting as a “casino” event, simply because federal markets were not able to exist, misses the entire point of what unimagined things can be.

Derivatives are useful because they allow risk transfer. This is a fundamental tenet of how all insurance models (and securitizations) work. And having insurance requires speculators on the other side; there is simply no other way to have it in a transparent and open market without government intervention. In fact, most often when insurance breaks it is because the state’s intervention distorts true market price for the bearer. Insurance and securitization remain one of the greatest financial innovations to have unlocked capital efficiency.

Yet the question of the “event” persists: at what point does the event really become a social ill versus having a naturally useful financial service? How does one go about developing an "event taxonomy?" This brings me to my final point.

“Prediction markets are different than other derivatives because of two key features: 1) they are Precise, and 2) they have a finite Expiry.”

To understand what this means, let us go back to Market Making 101 for a minute. In most financial markets, a CLOB (central limit order book) functions to gauge and provide liquidity because assets tend to have perpetual value. However, prediction markets are different: the event catalyst itself, once realized, collapses liquidity to zero in which there is no buyer or seller left on the other side. This creates a very challenging market for liquidity provisioners, because the payoff of 0 or 1 is a binary outcome where the assumption of continuous dynamic hedging is nullified.

Even more importantly, prediction markets are an odds-based market, not a price-based market. What this means is that a 2-point market on the midline (50) is significantly more liquid than a 2-point market at 98%, for the payout ratio on the latter is exponentially more onerous per point. In other words, liquidity cannot be provided continuously on a spread basis alone, a concept that fixed income derivatives traders understand very well versus equities (i.e. a 10bps move when rates are at 4% is very different from a 10bps move when rates are at 0.5%).

All of this means that professional market makers are not likely to provide a lot of liquidity in markets that have too much information asymmetry where the outcome can be precisely known with such an edge. And what that means is that most of the hypothetical arguments of insiders “cashing in” on inside information are likely to result in very small dollars. The market will ultimately determine what people care about. Yes, I have tremendous information on “Will Jeff Park wear a Bitwise sweater on his next podcast recording?” but the chance of that market having any liquidity is close to nil. A large part of the “anti-insider trading” argument assumes insiders will make so much money, but that’s not true for most markets. In summary, negligible markets will not have natural liquidity. In fact, I am willing to bet that the liquidity will price exactly how valuable that information is to begin with. That is how an event taxonomy can organically develop.

So then: why are prediction markets useful, such that it should outweigh the potential costs?

I mentioned earlier that they are Precise. This is one of the most virtuous aspects of prediction markets that must be emphasized. In a world where hyperfinancialization is causing asset prices to behave in ways that are determined more by technicals and flows than fundamental analysis or correctness, prediction markets stand alone in restoring the cleanest “basis risk” to truth. In the future, if you believe you have fundamental alpha on whether Tesla will beat top line or not, you should consider making that bet on a prediction market rather than the stock, which may behave idiosyncratically on other external factors. If you believe you have an edge on nonfarm payrolls, you should bet on that rather than Eurodollars or e-minis. In other words, precision better rewards true alpha, true research, and true skill.

So much of the argument that prediction markets prey on financially illiterate constituents assumes that “gamblers” are losing money, and so this is a social ill, when in fact they have the cleanest mechanism to create a fair market to reward true alpha for high-agency investors. This is made stronger by the fact that prediction markets have no house, and so unlike the Vegas casinos that kick out the highest +EV players, prediction markets want you to be here.

Citadel Securities and Charles Schwab both announced they are exploring entry into prediction markets. Are they “preying on economically vulnerable people”? I doubt it. They just understand the flip side of speculation is insurance better than most: that your concavity is my convexity.

Why the Gray Lady Fears the Market for Truth

This brings me to my final footnote. If you read all of the above, you have probably come to at least appreciate the power of prediction markets if regulated correctly. There are ways we can solve “gambling problems” and “social ills” if we believe that the benefits outweigh the costs. However, there is one last thing that you probably realized we glossed over: “what about insider trading on huge markets of public importance, and is that a privatized profit problem?”

This remains a complex question, and one that I am determined to answer in another post. However, what I wanted to leave you with is a thought and a book that I read recently called “

The Gray Lady Winked

” by Ashley Rindsberg. He documents decades of damning institutional failures that were simply not accidents: the suppression of Stalin’s famine by Duranty, Cuba and the very odd rise of Castro out of nowhere, the cheerleading for WMDs in Iraq, the systemic softening of Hitler’s rise, where the New York Times consistently stood in the middle with access, ideology, and institutional self-preservation muddying the need for truth.

If you read this book, you understand that it reframes “media bias” away from a left/right framing into something more structurally interesting: how prestige institutions manufacture consensus and then retroactively launder their errors. In fact, this brings us back to where we started: both Axios and More Perfect Union are not unbiased actors in this space. It is precisely for these reasons that you will continue to see many media outlets criticize prediction markets in the future. But make no mistake: the reason they don’t like it is the reason you should support it.

Information has a price. That’s not the debate.

I have also often stated that the opposite of misinformation is not necessarily truth; the opposite of misinformation is actually state-controlled information.

The debate is about who gets to set it and who gets to profit from it, and does that happen before you even see it. When insiders hoard asymmetric information, monetary motivations come second to the great bartering of power. By taxing everyone else’s ignorance, that information can be weaponized to sway sentiment or seed misinformation as the market for truth itself becomes captured. So the real argument against insider trading has less to do with economic efficiency as it really is about access, and about the fact that some people trade on what they know while the rest of us trade on what we’re allowed to know.

Once you see it that way, you don’t become cynical about prediction markets. You just become Precise about the world. That's why I continue to believe being optimistic about prediction markets is one of the most democratic values one can hold.